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Abstract: This article examines the birth of digital interactive screens from fire-control systems (esp. 
computerized radar) that distributed information processing in an ecology of operations among 
humans, computational instruments, and the environment. It proposes a concept of 
“computational screening” to account for the integration of visualization and information 
processing that gave rise to computer graphics.    
 
Digital screens emerge from the problem of integrating humans, computers, and their environment 
in a single problem-solving system. More specifically, digital graphics and computerized 
visualization emerged from the problem of integrating real-time feedback into computerized radar 
systems developed by the U. S. military after World War II.2 In the course of the 1950s and 1960s 
tinkering engineers adapted techniques developed for visualizing enemy trajectories to somewhat 
less bellicose applications in computer graphics. Indeed, a wide variety of early computer-
generated graphics—John Whitney’s computer-aided animations to Ivan Sutherland’s Sketchpad 
early video games like Spacewar! and Tennis for Two—did little more than tweak the techniques of 
aerial defense into diversions like visualizing abstract patterns and intercepting, so to speak, an 
opponent’s tennis ball.3 These systems, to borrow film historian Kyle Stine’s felicitous phrasing, 
                                               
1 I thank Jean Day and members of the Representations editorial board for invaluable feedback on this manuscript. 
The research for this article was funded in part by the Mellon Foundation and its Genealogy of the Excessive Screen Sawyer 
Seminar. Much of the research for this article was completed while I was a visiting professor in the Film & Media 
Studies program in 2016 and 2017 at Yale University and a fellow at the Whitney Humanities Center in in autumn 
2017. This article forms part of a larger book project on Screenscapes and ecologies of operations which I am co-
authoring with Francesco Casetti, whom I thank for his careful reading and comments on this text. I thank audiences 
at Yale University (and particularly respondent Rudiger Campe and colleague Craig Buckley) and Harvard University 
(particularly my host Mingyi Yu and Laura Frahm) for their feedback, as well as Lisa Åkervall, Yuriko Furuhato, 
Matthew Kirschenbaum, Paul Michael Kurtz, David Mindell, Fred Turner and especially Seth Watter. For aid finding 
and reproducing images, I thank Mal Ahern of Yale University, Krista Ferrante of the MITRE Corporation, and the 
staff of Yale University Libraries.    
2 Charlie Gere, “Genealogy of the Computer Screen,” Visual Communication 5, no. 2 (2006): 141–52. 
3 For a general introduction to the early years of computer graphics, see recollections of their development at MIT in 
connection with computerized radar research in Jan Hurst et al, “Retrospectives: The Early Years in Computer 
Graphics at MIT, Lincoln Lab and Harvard,” SIGGRAPH ’89 Panel Proceedings, 1989: 19–38; and Jan Hurst et al, 
“Retrospectives: The Early Years in Computer Graphics at MIT, Lincoln Lab and Harvard,” SIGGRAPH ’89 Panel 
Proceedings, 1989: 39–73. On Whitney’s adaptation of analog computers used for fire-control to experimental 
animations, see Zabet Patterson, “From the Gun Controller to the Mandala: The Cybernetic Cinema of John and 
James Whitney,” Grey Room 36 (Summer 2009): 36–57. On radar defense and the development of Tennis for Two, see 
Claus Pias, “The Game Player’s Duty: The User as the Gestalt of the Ports,” in Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, 
and Implications, ed. Erkki Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka (Berkeley: 2011), 164–83; and Claus Pias, Computer Spiel Welten 
(Berlin, 2002), 63-65. On the development of Sutherland’s Sketchpad see Ivan E. Sutherland, “Sketchpad: A Man-
Machine Graphical Communication System,” in The New Media Reader, ed. Noah Wardruip-Fruin and Nick Montfort 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 111–26; and Jacob Gaboury, “Image Objects: An Archaeology of Computer Graphics, 
1965-1979” (PhD diss., New York University, 2014), 196–99. 
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folded picturing and calculation into dual aspects of a single process.4 Beyond that, they allied the 
agency of humans and calculating instruments in a single circuit of information processing. In fire-
control systems (as mechanical-aided approaches to tracking and targeting the enemy are often 
called), these feedback circuits included the environment itself. Together, these elements of the 
system—human, instrument, environment—formed what I term an ecology of operations that 
distributed complex mathematical problems in recursive chains of transmissions.  
 
In the pages that follow I term this integration of visuality, calculation, territory, human problem-
solving, and the human body in early information processing computational screening. At the most 
basic level, this term designates the productive integration of visualization technologies (i.e. screen 
displays) and information processing (i.e. the screening and filtering of incoming data) that gave 
birth to digital graphics. Frequently, the screening of space (i.e. the flow of bodies across the 
membrane of a territory or through a battlefield) is also a key element of computational screening. 
As an analytical concept, computational screening calls attention to the history of computers as 
what Gilbert Simondon termed an “open machine,” reliant on continuous exchange with humans 
and their physical environment.5 In computational screening visual, graphical, and optical media, 
as well as physical space and human bodies, collaborate in the production of circuits of 
computation. Although computational screening took shape in the complex human-computer 
systems of twentieth century fire-control, today it includes a much wider array of problems 
involving conditions too complex to permit problem-solving by self-enclosed computing machines. 
The processing of crunchable social data by Facebook and the monitoring of traffic patterns by 
Waze, for example, involve the development of sophisticated visual interfaces that entice humans 
to complete information processing tasks too complex for digital instruments alone. Indeed, the 
actualization of computers into something approaching Turing’s universal machines is 
inconceivable without a vast array of visual interfaces that permit computers to enter into dynamic 
feedback loops with users and their environments. Without this optically-enabled circuit, the 
computer is little more than a fantastic automaton: that is, either an inert and preprogramed bauble 
or a plaything that dwells in the imagination.6 
 
This article reconstructs a history of computational screening as it developed from naval artillery 
control systems developed just after World War I through the deployment of the Semi-Automatic 
Ground Environment (SAGE) computerized radar defense system shortly before the 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis. This historical arc emphasizes how the demands that modern warfare placed upon 
vision, territory, and attention in this period produced not only a new kind of image but specifically 
a new kind of interactive image: one that enlisted bodies, attention, and calculation in the 
production of space. As art historian Pamela Lee has incisively written, “Cold War defense strategy 
could itself be described as a semiotic endeavor—an attempt to decode a shadowy enemy through 
a raft of signs both militaristic and cultural, including ‘indexical’ traces registered through the new 
technologies of radar; anthropological analyses of Soviet, Japanese, and German attitudes to 
authority; and the interactive dynamics observed within the ascendant field of the behavioral 
                                               
4 Kyle Stine, “The Coupling of Cinematics and Kinematics,” Grey Room 56 (Summer 2014): 36, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/GREY_a_00149. 
5 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects., trans. Cécile Malaspina and John Rogove 
(Minneapolis, 2017), 17.   
6 On robots, automata, and science fiction, see Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 16–17, 20; and 
Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects, trans. James Benedict (London, 1996), 128–32. 
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sciences.”7 I track one of these semiotic endeavors, the development of computational screening, 
an enterprise that drew on radar, computer science, psychology, moving images, physiology, 
geography and other fields to establish a martial aesthetic that informs the attention economies of 
twenty-first century digital cultures. 
 
This history of computational screening and its alliance of visual interfaces with information 
processing reframes an old problem concerning the relation of vision to computing. Frequently, 
theorists of media and visual culture have argued that the computer is not a visual device. Media 
theorist Friedrich Kittler posited that in an age of electronic screens “visible optics must disappear 
into the black hole of circuits…[because] computers, as they have existed since World War II, are 
not designed for image-processing at all.”8 Media theorists Wolfgang Hagen and Claus Pias echoed 
him, resolutely and respectively, by declaring that “there is no digital image.”9 These and other 
digital iconoclasts argue that, unlike traditional media such as photography, cinema, or painting 
that have a more or less determinate relationship to light, color, and spatial extension, electronic 
signals have no fixed and intrinsic relationship to the visual.10 Often these theorists further maintain 
that the digital image lacks stable relationships to human bodies and space.11 For the proponents 
of digital iconoclasm, electronic pictures are like the afterimages flickering into perception after the 
severing of an optical nerve: They may “look” like the real thing but they are the tricks of 
habituation bereft of any correspondence beyond the random flickering of electrical signals.  
 
The roots of computer screens in fire-control, however, undermine efforts to define computational 
images as radically disembodied without any relationship to optics, space, or computational 
processes. Under the conditions of modern warfare, maintaining the attention of jittery, easily 
distracted soldiers, often in monotonous conditions of inactivity punctuated by brief intervals of 
mind-numbing violence, was central to the computational endeavor. Prolonging real-time 
calculations across mechanical as well as manual digits, establishing continuous communications 
between the electrical signals of hardware and wetware, was integral to the techniques of fire-
control—so much so that it famously gave birth to a science of cybernetics that dissolved 
oppositions between mechanical computers and human users.12  
 
                                               
7 Pamela M. Lee, “Aesthetic Strategist: Albert Wohlstetter, the Cold War, and a Theory of Mid-Century Modernism,” 
October, no. 138 (Fall 2011): 27. 
8 Friedrich A. Kittler, Optical Media: Berlin Lectures 1999, trans. Anthony Enns (Malden, 2010), 225, 226. 
9 Wolfgang Hagen, “Es gibt kein ‘digitales Bild’. Eine medienepistemologische Anmerkung,” Archiv für Mediengeschichte 
2 (2002): 103–12; Claus Pias, “Das digitale Bild gibt es nicht: Über das (nicht-)Wissen der Bilder und die informatische 
Illusion,” Zeitenblicke 2, no. 1 (2003). 
10 On iconoclasm, see W. J. T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago: 1986), esp. 112-115.For a selection of 
writings in the tradition of digital iconoclasm, listed in approximate order of their initial public presentation (rather 
than English translation), see Vilém Flusser, Into the Universe of Technical Images, trans. Nancy Ann Roth (Minneapolis, 
2011); Friedrich A. Kittler, “Computer Graphics: A Semi-Technical Introduction,” trans. Sara Ogger, Grey Room 2 
(Winter 2001): 30–45; Frieder Nake, “Das doppelte Bild,” Bildwelten des Wissens 3, no. 2 (2005): 40–50; Alexander R. 
Galloway, The Interface Effect (Malden, 2012), 17–24. and Jacob Gaboury, “Hidden Surface Problems: On the Digital 
Image as Material Object,” Journal of Visual Culture 14, no. 1 (2015): 40. My discussion of digital iconoclasm is indebted 
to two critical sources in particular: Ricardo Cedeño Montaña and Christina Vagt, “Constructing the Invisible - 
Computer Graphics and the End of Optical Media,” Communication +1 7, no. 1 (2018); and Kyle Stine, “Critical 
Hardware: The Circuit of Image and Data,” Critical Inquiry 45 (Spring 2019): 762–86. 
11 See, for example, Jonathan Crary, Techniques of The Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 
MA, 1990), 2. 
12 Peter Galison, “The Ontology of the Enemy,” Critical Inquiry 21, no. 1 (1994): 228–68. 
 4 
As a basis for thinking about technical setups, fire-control turns analysis away from a conception 
of computers as self-contained and autonomous machines and towards a conception of computers 
as elements in control mechanisms whose distributing information flow across instruments, users, 
and their environments.13 Consider, for example, how Kittler’s account of digital images and optics 
shifts when fire-control is taken as the point of departure. Following Claude E. Shannon’s 
schematic diagram of a general communication system in “A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication” [Fig. 1] Kittler frequently likened electronic media to closed linear systems where 
humans only participate at the beginning and the end of the transmission chain, outside of the 
signal processing and calculations carried on by the machine.14 What Kittler neglects to mention 
is that in the same paper, Shannon offers a second schematic of communications systems such as 
appeared in 1940s fire-control systems (which Shannon studied during the war) and which featured 
an “observer” responsible for correcting data as it streamed through the communication system 
[Fig. 2] Only by omitting this second diagram from consideration could Kittler maintain his long-
running claim that electronic systems excluded human perception from their systems. Fire-control 
suggests a history of information processing that take this second diagram as its schematic and 
which makes allowances for optics to participate in the processing of digital and electronic signals. 
This reoriented perspective permits a new history of computing that draws links between the early 
decades of computing and screen-based computers of today.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Claude E. Shannon’s “schematic diagram of a communication system” interpreted by some media 
theorists to assume a linear channel of communications necessitation exclusion of humans from signal processing. 
Source: Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1949, 5. 
 
 
                                               
13 The history of computers as control mechanisms presents computers as technologies of articulation and intervention 
whose operations intertwine with their environment. In control systems, the physical world and algorithms often exist 
on a continuous plane and there no crisp opposition exists between representation and represented, material and ideal, 
continuous and discrete, and so on. Select accounts that locate computing technologies in the development of control 
systems includes Otto Mayr, The Origins of Feedback Control (Cambridge, MA, 1970); and David A. Mindell, Between 
Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing Before Cybernetics (Baltimore, 2002); and Seb Franklin, Control: Digitality 
as Cultural Logic (Cambridge, MA, 2015). 
14 “The eyes,” Kittler argues in one passage, “can only access these signals at the beginning and end of the transmission 
chain, in the studio and on the screen,” i.e. outside the transmission system proper. See Kittler, Optical Media, 226. For 
one of his many invocations of Shannon’s model as paradigmatic of communications in general, see pp. 43-46 in that 
same volume. 
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Figure 2: Claude E. Shannon’s “schematic diagram of a correction system” allowing for observers, human or 
otherwise, to take part in signal processing. This particular diagram recalls the setup of fire-control systems Shannon 
studied during the war, and which became the basis for postwar systems featuring screen technologies. Source: 
Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1949, 37. 
 
The Electronic Eye and the Radar Defense Screen 
The tensions that spurred the development of computational screening were on display in in 1954 
in an episode of the US-American television documentary program Science in Action titled “Radar 
Defense Screen.” Broadcast from a not-yet computerized radar defense defensive sector, it showed 
how an ecology of electronics, images, and bodies, inclusive of numerical and graphical mediations, 
came together to form screening technologies. The program opened with a call to viewers to 
practice a new vigilance over space and time. “[T]oday,” the host explained, “our two oceans, one 
on either side of the country, are no longer barriers to a sudden surprise attack.”15 The television 
screen cut to shots of an enemy fighter plane flying overhead, followed by images of a nondescript 
American city turned coal black as mushroom clouds filled the screen. “Now what we saw there,” 
warned the host, “could happen to any of us.” In anticipation of such threats, the United States 
Air Force had developed the radar defense screen, “an electronic eye which sweeps the sky both 
by day and by night to prevent the arrival of any unwelcome intruder.” The earnest host and his 
military guests took viewers on a tour of a regional radar control center where teams of soldiers 
gathered to scrutinized cathode ray screens, transparent plotting boards, and regional maps. 
Tracking and targeting enemies demanded faithful transposition of coordinates from radio waves 
in the field across electronics to visual displays where humans, screening out an enemy signal from 
the meteorological noise, transmitted data to plotting boards for extrapolation and analysis by a 
strictly ordered military hierarchy. A moment’s inattention, a slip-up in numerical digits or 
Cartesian coordinates, or simple miscommunication somewhere in the chain of command could 
lead to fissile annihilation on American soil.  
 
Computer graphics emerged from these kinds of efforts to calculate against the catastrophe of 
incalculable destruction. The effort to defend American frontiers in the 1950s put intense pressure 
on the gaps between human and machine, among the most fragile links in the vast networks of 
radar defense distributed along the North American coasts. This defensive situation called for 
faithful screening, both in terms of information processing and visual display (terms neither 
mutually exclusive nor neatly distinguishable in this process). The first digital computer screens—
displays of electronic data modulated in real-time through the networked interfacing of human 
users and computer processing—arose from this nexus of temporal, spatial, and cognitive pressures 
                                               
15 “Radar Defense Screen,” Science in Action, March 30, 1954, online at https://archive.org/details/Sciencei1956_5. 
The 1956 date listed online appears to be incorrect, or at least not refer to the initial date of broadcast. I have used the 
copyright date cited in the Library of Congress catalog of copyright entries.  
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embodied by mid-twentieth century North American aerial defense. In it, screens and screening—
i.e. (1) techniques of visual display, (2) techniques of filtering signal from noise, and (3) techniques 
for regulating the flow of bodies to produce a specific space—converged in an information 
processing network that transformed visuality and territory in one fell swoop.16 The soon to be 
unveiled SAGE computerized radar defense system integrated radar data from its sector with 
computer records of pre-planned flights and mapped it onto familiar cartographic screens for 
human interpretation [Figs. 3 and 4]. With the click of buttons, human operators could identify 
unidentified flight paths and dispatch Nike missiles or jet squadrons to intercept the unknown 
projectile. In this process of screening, intervention took priority over representation. The screen 
presenting graphics to an operator did not represent information in a machine but instead took 
part in its production. Successful screening procedures produced continuity among space, body, 
and mathematics.   
 
Figure 3: Situation displays in the SAGE air surveillance room presented real-time pictures of the air space around a 
particular defensive sector (e.g. New England). Source: “Pushbutton Defense for Air War.” Life 42, no. 6 (1957): 62. 
 
 
Figure 4: Diagram of a situation display screen depicting a coastline, planes and their flight paths, a missile and its 
flight path, and various characters for cartographic labelling.  Theory of Operation of Display System for AN/FSQ-7 Combat 
Direction Center and AN/FSQ-8 Combat Control Central, Volume I. Kingston, New York: International Business Machines 
Corporation, 1958, p. 21. 
                                               
16 On screening as a media theoretical problem, see Jeremy Packer and Kathleen F. Oswald, “From Windscreen to 
Widescreen: Screening Technologies and Mobile Communication,” The Communication Review 13, no. 4 (2010): 309–
39; and W. J. T. Mitchell, “Screening Nature (and the Nature of the Screen),” New Review of Film and Television Studies 
13, no. 3 (2015): 231–46. On radar and SAGE as screening technologies, see Jeremy Packer, “Screens in the Sky: 
SAGE, Surveillance, and the Automation of Perceptual, Mnemonic, and Epistemological Labor,” Social Semiotics 23, 
no. 2 (2013): 173–95.  
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That  a new computational image from mapping technology is little surprise. As Valérie 
November, Eduardo Camacho-Hübner, and Bruno Latour have observed, “maps have always 
been calculation interfaces” and the closest precedent to the aerial maps of radar defense, the 
nautical chart (i.e. map), “is like a 2D slide-rule that incorporates in a precalculated format huge 
masses of information about angles and distances on which is overlaid in various fonts other types 
of information….”17 Map-making economically condenses a vast range of calculations within the 
space of a flat surface, with the understanding that navigators would recognize this image as a kind 
of tool, a data set, whose visuality contained a series of mathematical affordances for the user to 
later extract and complete. Early radar displays animated mathematical affordances already 
present in the classical nautical charts, thereby bringing its stable lines of force into alignment with 
the temporality of modern warfare. Indeed, the demand for time-critical computations spread 
across human-machine networks were the raison d’être for these new displays; embedded within 
them was a temporality of emergency that called for interfaces encouraging constant vigilance.18 
 
Figure 5: Diagram showing how segments of the situation display screen zoom in to provide more detailed display of 
a particular regions. Source: Theory of Operation of Display System for AN/FSQ-7 Combat Direction Center and AN/FSQ-8 
Combat Control Central, Volume I. Kingston, New York: International Business Machines Corporation, 1958, p. 116. 
 
The technical hallmarks of the emerging electronic image, which continue to define the aesthetics 
of the digital image today—processual, interactive, modular, gridded, time-critical—corresponded 
to the procedural and temporal properties of mid-century radar defense [Fig. 5]. It eschewed stable 
and indexical traces in favor of algorithmic flickers that updated instantaneously according to the 
time-critical operations. The aesthetics of this image produced vigilant teams of users whose 
attention was focused by the glimmer of the electronic screen, their cognitions knit together by a 
screenscape distributed across the defensive region and among their fellow soldiers within the 
control room. Each operators’ personal screens divided the sector into a manageable segments for 
information screen, much as individual screens divided that sector into small quadrants and even 
pixels for individual attention. In this regard, both the digital image and the psychology it cultivated 
manifest the atmosphere of anxiety ultimately responsible for their production. By the mid-
twentieth century, radiation, rockets, and atomic warfare formed a threatening trio that 
                                               
17 Valérie November et al, “Entering a Risky Territory: Space in the Age of Digital Navigation,” Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 28, no. 4 (2010): 582 and 585. 
18 I borrow the term time-critical from Wolfgang Ernst, who defines it as “a special class of [media-based] events where 
exact timing and the temporal momentum is ‘decisive’ for the processes to take place and succeed at all.” See Jussi 
Parikka, “Ernst on Time-Critical Media: A Mini-Interview,” Machinology: Machines, Noise, and Some Media Archaeology by 
Jussi Parikka (blog), March 18, 2013, https://jussiparikka.net/2013/03/18/ernst-on-microtemporality-a-mini-
interview/. See also Axel Volmar, ed., Zeitkritische Medien (Berlin, 2009). I fully embrace Ernst’s refusal to reduce time-
critical operations to a temporality defined entirely in terms of human experience, in the case of SAGE it is equally 
impossible to expel human experience from this temporality.   
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overwhelmed existing means of screening and territorial control. Science in Action’s warning that this 
“could happen to any of us” announced this reconstitution of space ca. 1954 in which the apparatus 
of televisual broadcasting itself participated.19 Like radar, television converted electromagnetic 
waves into graphical displays to provide instantaneous pictures from remote locations. Electronic 
media such as radar, television, and the digital screen embodied a pharmacological response, an 
attempt to reassert national territorial integrity by means of the same technologies responsible for 
its dissolution.20  
 
Birth of the Computer-Generated Moving Image 
Computational screening took hold at sea. Long before the twentieth century, maritime 
instruments such as the astrolabe, compass, nautical chart, sextant, and log joined optics and image 
together with number and line to produce stable, navigable coordinates.21 The difficulty of 
controlling space in modern naval warfare, however, brought new pressures to bear on this 
problem. As historian of technology David Mindell has written, “[w]arfare at sea takes place on a 
battlefield with no landmarks, no terrain, no features. More akin to a magnetic field than to a 
farmer’s field, it is characterized not by stable geography but by imaginary lines of force imposed 
upon an otherwise smooth and turbulent space…. Bringing these spaces under quantitative control 
required instruments to establish references for heading, horizon, and lines of fire.”22 The problem 
of two or more bodies in mutual motion in wide open space, hurling projectiles at one another 
across great distances, called for the development of new technologies of vision.  
  
In 1916 the Sperry Gyroscope Company released the Sperry Fire Control System to manufacture 
the stable, calculable territory demanded by modern warfare at sea. The Sperry Fire Control 
System and its successors shifted the task of identifying, targeting, and firing on an enemy from one 
or two persons and their corresponding instruments to an information processing system 
distributed across the ship. This setup amalgamated image, writing, number, and body within a 
single circuit or ecology of operations [Fig. 6]. One device that ensured the timely relay of 
calculations between the mechanical system and its human components was the Battle Tracer [Fig. 
7], a revolutionary computer that plotted the motions of host and enemy ships in real-time during 
battle.23 It consolidated a variety of data streams into an animated image produced by a graphical 
writer as a battle unfolded.24 Inputs from spotters above deck as well as instruments such as the 
                                               
19 On this testing of the thresholds of visibility and representation by radiation and atomic energies, see Akira Mizuta 
Lippit, Atomic Light (Shadow Optics) (Minneapolis, 2005). 
20 The Science in Action episode thus belonged to a family of postwar technologies, such as including duck-and-cover 
school training for bombing raids, lavishly illustrated magazines on Cold War mobilization, that cultivated constant 
readiness in view of the fraying distinctions between homeland and battlefront, peace and war.  For more on this 
fraying of distinctions, see Beatriz Colomina, Domesticity at War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007). 
21 See, for example, Bernhard Siegert, “The Chorein of the Pirate: On the Origin of the Dutch Seascape,” Grey Room 
57 (Fall 2014): 6–23. 
22 Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, 22. 
23 For more on the Battle Tracer, its operations, and the context of its development, see Thomas Parke Hughes, Elmer 
Sperry: Inventor and Engineer (Baltimore, 1971), 232–33; James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic 
Origins of the Information Society (Cambridge, MA, 1986), 304–7; Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of 
Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (New York: Viking, 1989), 135–37; and Mindell, Between Human and 
Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing Before Cybernetics, 30–35. For a primary document on the Fire Control System 
and its operations, see the publisher’s catalog The Sperry Fire Control System [Catalog] (New York: The Sperry Gyroscope 
Company, 1916). Courtesy of Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware.  
24 Hughes, Elmer Sperry: Inventor and Engineer, 232–33; Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing 
Before Cybernetics, 31–32. 
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ship engine combined to provide up-to-date graphical representations of the locations and bearings 
of the friend and enemy ships. Officers fed data from the Battle Tracer to a transmitter that 
supplied targeting data to the battery of guns on the decks above.  
 
 
Figure 6: Historian David Mindell’s diagram reconstructing the Sperry Fire Control System and its distribution of 
targeting across the ship and its crew. Source: David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and 
Computing Before Cybernetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 31. 
 
 
Figure 7: The Battle Tracer mounted on a table. Source: The Sperry Fire Control System [Catalog], Bulletin 304, Sperry 
Gyroscope Company, Brooklyn, NY, ca. 1916. Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware. 
 
Computational images that translated numerical representations into optical formats more easily 
processed by humans bound together the Sperry Fire Control System. Above deck a human 
director in a tower used monocular telescopes [Fig. 8] to track an enemy ship’s range, bearing, and 
speed; manual and automatic instruments converted these observations into electrical impulses 
transmitted to gunnery officers below deck; these officers cross-referenced the data with printed 
firing tables and, equipped with compass and protractor, translated this data into a cartographic 
form that determined elevation and bearing for artillery to intersect an enemy vessel. Humans 
entered the solution into an electromechanical device that delivered transmissions to receivers in 
the gun turret, which then provided visual arrows indicating where the gun should be aimed. Back 
in the towers, timers that predicted the flight time of munitions would ring at the precise moment 
when the fired artillery landed, thus aiding human spotters in gathering data for targeting 
corrections and setting the entire cycle of data processing back into motion. In these systems, data 
travelled in loops, converting from biological through numerical to graphical media minute-by-
minute, rapidly shifting from analog to digital forms, and across optical and aural outputs.  
 
The Sperry Fire Control System fashioned users, instruments, and space as complementary 
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elements into an ecology of operations. The circulating images of the Battle Tracer (and its digital 
descendants) integrated humans, machines, and space into a physical system of recursive feedback 
within a thoroughly real, physical territory. The Battle Tracer was less a picture of existing space 
than the latent reservoir of actions producing this contested territory: Should the ship pivot 
starboard in pursuit of the enemy? Should it beat a hasty retreat? Should it hold its current course 
and fire on the foe? Where, for that matter, might the foe be found? By condensing signals from 
across the ship into a graphical output, the Battle Tracer diagrammed potential responses to these 
queries. The answer chosen by an officer and entered into the transmitters set in motion signals for 
the production of new data series and new environments. From the urgent needs of modern 
maritime warfare, computational screening had been born.    
 
 
Figure 8: Directorscope in the Sperry Fire Control System that would have manned by human director. It was 
equipped with monoscope and it electrically transmitted coordinates to officers below deck. Source: Navy Ordnance 
Activities: World War, 1917-1918. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920, p. 158-3. 
 
Radar as Nested Screening Operations 
In 1932 Stanley Baldwin of the British House of Commons declared plainly, “it is well for the man 
in the street to realize that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed.”25 
This realization put into motion the British invention of radar, its rapid improvement by the Allies 
during World War II, and ultimately a new era of electronic images. The imperative for new 
screening technologies sprang from the rapidly diminishing efficacy of the British Channel as a 
natural defense against enemy intrusion in an age of rapidly augmenting aerial powers and 
munitions. During World War I the British Isles suffered a stunning 103 air raids at a cost of 1,413 
lives and the British military command expected those numbers to be dwarfed in wars to come.26 
In the mid 1930s British scientists found a possible response to the emerging spatiotemporal ratios 
of warfare when they determined that precisely attuned networks of radio relay systems distributed 
along the coastline could provide a kind of electromagnetic “screen” that offered the minimum 
warning necessary to scramble a counter-offense. Engineers abbreviated this system of radio 
detection and ranging “radar.”   
 
Radar operates according to a nested series of screening operations. The first screening typically 
happens at the level of the environment itself: radar transformed hundreds of miles of open space 
into a surface for the reflection of radio waves travelling at a rate of 186,000 miles per second 
                                               
25 Robert Buderi, The Invention That Changed the World: How a Small Group of Radar Pioneers Won the Second World War and 
Launched a Technical Revolution (New York, 1996), 53. 
26 Buderi, The Invention That Changed the World, 52. 
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before reflecting back to a precisely tuned receiver. Planes and other protruding objects in open 
spaces became screens that, like an inverted x-ray photograph, return waves to their point of 
emission. In the typical radar setup of the 1940s, received signals were projected by an electron 
beam aimed at the flat end of a cathode ray tube (CRT), which provided a rudimentary screen for 
human operators to interpret. The human operator acted as an additional screen responsible for 
filtering out signal from noise (Shannon’s “observer”), i.e. distinguishing the phantomlike blip of 
an approaching enemy from clouds, flocks of birds, irregular surfaces, and other obstructions that 
rendered the returning signal difficult to read. Once operators identified an enemy, they worked 
with the commanding officers and teams in the field to enforce a defensive screening perimeter 
that intercepted the enemy with planes and artillery.  
 
Radar of the 1940s devised a series of dynamic electronic displays to ensure accurate assignment 
of enemy locations. The earliest radar display format, the A-Scope [Fig. 9, Type A], featured a 
single line that scanned from left to right along the horizontal access. As successive waves of rays 
reflected, they displayed as jagged “pips” erupting into the vertical axis of the screen, thereby 
contouring distributions in real space through the temporal patterning of rays translated by the 
scanning beam into a graphical form. Depending on the strength and profile of a pip, an 
experienced reader could distinguish various objects—for example, birds, planes, or buildings—
and their elevation. Another display, the J-Scope, stretched the timeline around the circumference 
of the oscilloscope, thus doubling the length of the timeline and allowing for a more exact 
measurement of distance [Fig. 9, Type J]. A third type of display developed late in the war, the 
Plan Position Indicator or “PPI,” executed 360-degree rotating scans of the surrounding milieu 
and displayed the results in a manner reminiscent of more traditional two-dimensional 
cartographic renderings [Fig. 9, Type P]. In all these setups, the oscilloscope functioned not just as 
a surface for representations but also as a short-term storage device for electronically calculated 
data. The short-term duration of these data allowed another element in the calculating apparatus, 
namely the human operator, to access, modify, and relate the data of other elements in the system 
(human or nonhuman) responsible for targeting.  
 
Figure 9: Fifteen variations on radar data display, each varying the display according to a particular conception of 
how best to distribute computation across human and nonhumans elements. The simplest format, an A-Scope (Type 
A), displayed range on x axis and the intensity of a reflected waves on the y axis.  J-Scopes (Type J) stretched the 
display of range around the circumference of the screen. Over time Type P, the plan position indicator (PPI), which 
represented relations in a manner that resembled traditional two-dimensional maps, became more widespread. 
Source:  Radar School of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Principles of Radar. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., 1946, p. 3-3. 
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The displays employed by a particular radar screen corresponded to a specific local task as well 
as  an ecological distribution of operations across environment, system, instrument, and teams of 
human users. This ecology of operations invested images with a mixture of multimedial and 
interactive capacities: the value of an image related to its ability to correlate with other kinds of 
images and data points. Take, for example, the celebrated SCR-584 radio set. Two operators 
would sit at a console [Fig. 10] that included two J-scopes measuring coarse (32,000 yards) and 
fine (2,000 yards) range of objects, respectively, to allow for increasingly precise visualization as 
the enemy approached. A third oscilloscope represented the entire surrounding region in a PPI 
format. Supplementary handwheels controlled antenna position and azimuth and, depending on 
the setup of that particular 584, permitted the operators to isolate distinct pips on the J-scopes for 
automatic tracking. Early versions of the SCR-584 relied on human officers who plotted 
observations in graphical form and extrapolated trajectories for human directors sitting at 
artillery in the field [Fig. 11]. Calculation occurred not in discrete devices as well as in series 
distributed across these media. Towards the war’s end, engineers developed mechanical 
computers for the SCR-584 that directed the guns automatically. While the SCR-584 was 
designed for battlefield deployment in trailers, similar setups could be found in the bellies of 
planes, in hangars, and at airports. To each of these installations corresponded a constellation of 
images, screens, and operators specific to the local territorial conditions.  
 
 
Figure 10: Main operating console for the SCR-584. Image modified by author to number the coarse range J-scope 
(1), the fine range J-Scope (2), the PPI scope (3), and the antenna hand wheels for controlling antenna elevation (4) 
and azimuth (5). Source: Radio Sets SCR-584-A and SCR 584-B Service Manual: Theory, Troubleshooting, and Repair. 
Technical Manual II-1524. Washington, D.C.: War Department, July 1946, Yale University Libraries, New Haven, 
Connecticut. 
 
 
Fig. 11: Interior of SCR-584 trailer featuring radar operators and officer at the manual plotting board. Source: 
David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing Before Cybernetics. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 253. 
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The images circulating with the network of a specific radar set coincided with a wider family of 
images that worked in tandem to stabilize the battlefield and produce a manageable territory. 
Nearly each step in this network of images effected a kind of screen test, by which some visual 
representation provided a regulative mechanism conditioning its users or controlling the flow of 
information. Flight training films inculcated in gunners and pilots the necessary discipline to 
perform in the heat of battle, providing a corollary in celluloid to the real-time navigation and 
targeting information supplied by ground and aerial radar systems;27 cameras mounted on guns 
and in cockpits recorded the performance of crew members, allowing for post facto reconstruction 
of team members’ performance in battle;28 video maps inserted between the end of the cathode 
ray and the human operator facilitated the screening of the raw radar display with additional 
screens and images;29 and aerial reconnaissance photography provided officers in command 
centers as well as navigators with means for touring enemy territory in advance of actual offensive 
missions.30The essence of the radar screen, then, resided not so much within representations 
constrained by the circular frame of the oscilloscope but rather within a wider family of interactive 
images that managed the integration of human and machine elements around the task of 
producing and controlling territory. 
 
Psychophysics of the Scope Dope  
Electronic screens, radio waves, and jet propulsion redistributed visuality on the battlefield; 
psychology and physiology, aided by motion pictures, multiple choice tests, time-motion studies, 
photography, and Pavlovian bells, constructed it in laboratories.31 By the early 1940s the U.S. and 
U.K. militaries employed a growing staff of human scientists charged with training humans to 
received, renewed, and filtered electronic signals. Research teams comprised of psychologists, 
                                               
27 For more on the use of film in aviation testing and training during World War II, see the primary document James 
J. Gibson, Motion Picture Testing and Research, Aviation Psychology Program Research Reports (Washington, D.C.: Army 
Air Forces, 1947). 
28 See, for example, Standards and Curriculum Division, “Aircraft Fire Control,” Navy Training Courses 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 127. 
29 John S. Hall, ed., Radar Aids to Navigation (New York, 1966), 268. 
30 On aerial reconnaissance in World War I, see Bernhard Siegert, “Luftwaffe Fotografie. Luftkrieg als 
Bildverarbeitungssystem 1911-1921,” Fotogeschichte: Beiträge zur Geschichte und Ästhetik der Fotographie 12, no. 45/46 (1992): 
41–54; and Allan Sekula, “The Instrumental Image: Steichen at War,” Artforum 14, no. 4 (December 1975): 26–35. 
For more on its use in training and testing in World War II, see the primary document Stuart W. Cook, “Psychological 
Research on Radar Observer Training,” Aviation Psychology Program Research Reports (Washington, D.C.: Army 
Air Forces, 1947), 291, Yale University Libraries. 
31 See, for example, the wartime reports and summaries of wartime research: Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, “Range Finders and Tracking,” Summary Technical Report of Division 7, NDRC (Washington, D.C., 1947), 
67–146; “Radar Operator ‘Fatigue’: The Effect of Length and Repetition of Operating Periods on Efficiency of 
Performance,” Applied Psychology Panel, NDRC, Project SC-70, NS-146, Selection and Training of Oscilloscope 
Operators, January 4, 1944; J. K. Adams, D. C. Beier, and H. A. Imus, “The Influence of the Visual Tasks Required 
of Personnel in the 16 Weeks Fire Controlmen (O) Training Course Upon Their Visual Proficiency,” Applied 
Psychology Panel, NDRC, Project N-114, Selection and Training of Rangefinder and Radar Operators, August 1, 
1944; N. H. Mackworth, “The Breakdown of Vigilance during Prolonged Visual Search,” Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 1, no. 1 (1948): 6–21 (declassified publication of formerly classified wartime research). Oliver 
Gaycken notes the particular importance of moving images for training and testing soldiers, discussing the wartime 
work of J. J. Gibson in particular: Oliver Gaycken, “Cinema Is ‘I Fly’: J. J. Gibson and the Work of the Army Air 
Force’s Psychological Test Film Unit,” unpublished. On the mobilization of vigilance, in particular, see the excellent 
secondary source Kenneth Rogers, The Attention Complex: Media, Archeology, Method (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014), 78–89. 
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physiologists, sociologists, and medical doctors refashioning human perception for improved 
processing of data relayed by lenses, scopes, tubes, maps, protractors, cameras, timers and other 
pieces of hardware. As testament to the growing cross-fertilization in mechanical factors and 
human factors, the director of U.S. fire-control research during World War II, himself a Sperry 
veteran, declared that during the war he had “learned more from the psychologists than from the 
engineers.”32 The product of this psychophysical endeavor was the “scope dope,” the colloquial 
term for the radar operator, whose cognitive mapping eschewed a heroic individual interior in 
favor of a psychic apparatus of electromechanical relays. Their so-called dopiness testified to their 
successful externalization of sense in electronics.  
 
Wartime research into how stress, duress, gender, temporal duration, visual ambiguities, acoustic 
stimulation, and amphetamine usage shaped the performance of radar operators set in motion of 
new knowledge of electronic screens and the human body. The study of how human bodies 
responded to hours gazing at screens was an urgent technological and physiological problem whose 
findings would shape the design of electronic screens and the training protocols of future IT 
industries. The overlapping and nested research bodies enacting cognitive redistribution during 
the war included the Committee on Aviation Medicine, the National Defense Research Council, 
the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the Psychological Test Film Unit, the Applied 
Psychology Panel, the Aviation Psychology Panel, and the Medical Research Council Applied 
Psychology Research Unit (UK). Researchers for these bodies typically identified a problem on 
human information processing that could be isolated with media technics for study and 
disciplining. For example, US military researchers developed a measure of fourteen interrelated 
psychophysical aptitudes suitable for cultivation and managed enhancement through batteries of 
tests and exercises: skills at length and distance perception, mechanical experience, memory for 
landmarks, memory for visual patterns, numerical facility, speed of visual pattern discrimination, 
psychomotor coordination, psychomotor precision, spatial reasoning, insight into spatial relations, 
insight into rotational space, verbal comprehension and visualization skills.33 Among the written 
tests, the Spatial Orientation Test [Fig. 12] examined the ability to locate pre-identified landmark 
features in aerial photos of cities quickly, while the Spot Location Test gauged the ability to stably 
transpose coordinates across representations. Together, these and other studies provided a profile 
of how humans processed information in fast-moving environments characterized by information 
incoming along numerical, graphical, and other channels. 
 
In the decade after World War II, psychophysical mobilization put a growing emphasis on the 
coordination of complex teams around systems with the aid of screens. One focus of this work was 
the development of improved screen technologies to facilitate better information processing and 
team collaboration. Centers such as the Systems Research Laboratory (1945-1959), initially of 
Harvard University, brought together psychologists, physicists, time-and-motion engineers, 
engineers of radar and sonar systems, communication engineers, operations-research experts, and 
gunnery trainers to research the best setups for communications data across circuits of humans and 
electronic instruments. Their studies aligned knowledge of data transmission rates and radio wave 
encoding with the optimal disposition of chairs, screens, plotting boards, and other human 
                                               
32 Joseph C. Boyce, ed., New Weapons for Air Warfare: Fire-Control Equipment, Proximity Fuzes, and Guided Missiles (Boston, 
1947), 75. 
33 Cook, “Psychological Research on Radar Observer Training,” 24–26. 
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factors.34 Within these studies, new screen technologies smoothed the most problematic links in the 
human-machine synthesis. Consider a 1947 Johns Hopkins University study of experimental PPIs 
carried out in concert with the Systems Research Laboratory.35 The study, which allied engineers 
with human scientists from the psychological laboratory, sought to resolve the unwieldy 
proliferation of screens and interfaces in World War II-era radar. It reviewed efforts to present 
range, elevation, and azimuth in a compact, three-dimensional display [Fig. 13]. Although this 
effort involved the engineering of new interfaces, authors stressed their inquiry was “psychological” 
in nature, aimed at determining “how accurately a man can understand and extract information 
from a display of this sort.”36 The resulting knowledge described human and machine as a 
composite engaged in a collaborative act of information screening.  
 
Figure 12: By the time radar operators reached the field they had been tested and trained on a wide battery of image 
technologies. For example, the “Spatial Orientation Test,” an offshoot of aerial reconnaissance photography, tested 
radar operators' ability to correlate regions in large aerial photographs with detailed closeups. In testing, operators 
had five minutes to assign a location to 48 detail images in total. This is one example of how military techniques 
deployed images for information processing and screening purposes.  Source: Source: Stuart W. Cook, 
“Psychological Research on Radar Observer Training.” Aviation Psychology Program Research Reports. 
Washington, D.C.: Army Air Forces, 1947, p. 291. Yale University Libraries. 
 
Figure 13: One example of the experimental radar screen technologies developed after World War II. This model 
sought to reproduce depth perception through projections on a curved dome. Source: J. W. Gebhard and E. A 
Bilodeau. “Appraisal of an Experimental Plan Position Indicator Representing Bearing, Range, and Height 
Information.” Report of the Special Devices Center, Office of Naval Research. Baltimore: Systems Research Field 
Laboratory and Psychological Laboratory (The Johns Hopkins University), December 15, 1947, p. 3. Defense 
Technical Information Center Archives. 
                                               
34 Throughout this paragraph I draw on Henry McIlvaine Parsons, Man-Machine System Experiments (Baltimore, 1972), 
107–13. 
35 J. W. Gebhard and E. A Bilodeau, “Appraisal of an Experimental Plan Position Indicator Representing Bearing, 
Range, and Height Information,” Report of the Special Devices Center, Office of Naval Research (Baltimore: Systems 
Research Field Laboratory and Psychological Laboratory (The Johns Hopkins University), December 15, 1947), 
Defense Technical Information Center Archives, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/639287.pdf. 
36 Gebhard and Bilodeau, “Appraisal of an Experimental Plan Position Indicator Representing Bearing, Range, and 
Height Information,” v. 
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These and other studies showcased how multimedia design could efficiently allocate information 
processing across human and nonhuman components. Designers of Combat Information Centers 
(CICs) and flight control centers gave to machines the role of tracking prescheduled flights and to 
humans the role of interpreting irregularities.37 Specialized screens and audio outputs promised to 
alert human operators to aberrations in prescheduled flights, thereby shifting the burden of 
screening the skies to exceptional events rendered in vivid multimedia. These allocations 
demanded the design of standard protocols for human users’ multimedia outputs as well. For 
example, at a meeting on “Aviation Communication” held at the Pentagon, participants advocated 
for the standardization of speech protocols, the training of operators in more disciplined verbal 
articulation, and the enhancement of “circuit discipline” to control for noise as vital steps towards 
improving nationwide air traffic control.38 Studies in other military projects examined a broad 
range of design factors that shaped the performance of human-machine systems, including headset 
and microphone design, the relative advantages of differently colored over differently shaped 
console buttons, advantages of horizontal over vertically mounted screens, note-taking, and even 
the effects of temperature on human judgment.39 Design of total communication systems produced 
an ever-finer attention management of haptic, aural, visual, and ergonomic factors.  
 
These studies of information processing in aerial defense systems came to enjoy a status in 
twentieth-century theories of mind comparable to that of the camera obscura in the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century thought.40 A large part of this privileged epistemic status came from the stellar 
community of human scientists directly or indirectly enlisted in these studies between the 1940s 
and 1960s, including George A. Miller, J. J. Gibson, John L. Kennedy, Allen Newell, and J. C. R. 
Licklider.41  When one includes the entire complex of cybernetic researchers who based new 
theories of cognition on World War II fire-control research the list rapidly expands to include 
Norbert Wiener, Claude Shannon, Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
Roman Jakobson, and Harold Garfinkel.42 These scholars and their students launched a new 
                                               
37 See, for example, the primary source Joseph G. Adiletta and Robert L. Chapman, “Layout of the Combat 
Information Center in the PO-2W Aircraft,” Technical Report, SDC Human Engineering Project 20-F-4, Project 
NR-784-006 (New York University, April 1951), Defense Technical Information Center Archives; and the secondary 
source Layne Karafantis, “NORAD’s Combat Operations Center: A Distinctively Cold War Environment,” 
Information & Culture: A Journal of History 52, no. 2 (2017): 139–62. 
38 Office of Naval Research, “Minutes of the Conference on Aviation Communication Systems” (The Pentagon, 
Washington, D. C.: Department of the Navy, June 7, 1951), esp. 3-6, Yale University Libraries. 
39 Examples drawn from Joan C. Robinette, “Bibliography on Aeromedical Research with Abstracts” (Aerospace 
Medical Laboratory, December 1959), 1–3, Defense Technical Information Center Archives, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a955081.pdf. 
40 Crary, Techniques of The Observer. 
41 See George A. Miller, “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for 
Processing Information,” The Psychological Review 63, no. 2 (March 1956): 81–97; and Paul N. Edwards, The Closed 
World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge, 1996), 175–238. See also Gibson, “Motion 
Picture Testing and Research.” See also the 1950s studies of air defense teams in Robert L. Chapman et al., “The 
Systems Research Laboratory’s Air Defense Experiments,” Management Science 5, no. 3 (1959): 250–69 (Newell was a 
member of this research project and a co-author on the report). See also J.C.R. Licklider’s “Man-Computer 
Symbiosis,” IRE Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics HFE-1 (March 1960): 4–11. 
42 On Wiener, see his seminal co-authored text, Arturo Rosenblueth et al, “Behavior, Purpose, Teleology,” Philosophy 
of Science 1 (January 1943): 18–24; and Peter Galison, “The Ontology of the Enemy.” On Shannon, see Claude E. 
Shannon, “Presentation of a Maze Solving Machine,” in Cybernetics: Circular, Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological 
and Social Systems, Transactions Eighth Conference, March 15-16, 1951, ed. M. Mead et al (New York, 1952), 169–81; and 
Mindell, Between Human and Machine, 319–21. Regarding Margaret Mead, see Margaret Mead, “Cybernetics of 
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understanding of cognition as distributed in external systems of communications modelled on the 
solider in a complex aerial defense network. Through this growing body of research, the scope 
dope became not merely one type studied by social science but rather its ideal type. As a paradigm 
of thought, this research eschewed the heroic individual of classical liberalism and replaced it with 
the individual as a node in a complex network of screening operations distributed across body, 
society, and the environment. Reflecting the origins of this model in computational screening, 
technical operations characterized these theorists’ accounts, as if every society possessed its own 
peculiar rationality in which particular bodies served merely as algorithmic filters for the 
communication of a collective computational unconscious. 
 
David Riesman’s celebrated 1950 invocation of radar in The Lonely Crowd to describe an emerging 
American personality type anticipated the generalization of the scope dope into a model American-
type.43 Earlier generations of Americans had been endowed with a sort of “psychological 
gyroscope”44 that, like the real gyroscope of naval navigation, had no need of external information 
processing equipment to provide a reliable orientation. In postwar America those inner-directed 
types were being succeeded by a new sociality of other-directed types, who “must be able to receive 
signals from far and near; the sources are many, the changes rapid.” The “one prime psychological 
lever of the other-directed person is a diffuse anxiety. This control equipment, instead of being like 
a gyroscope, is like a radar.”45 Perpetually scanning the horizon, sending out signals and receiving 
messages, and getting its bearings by reference to a peer group on the one hand and an 
electronically-mediated “screen of words,” on the other, Riesman’s radar-type projected onto an 
emerging postwar American population a subjectivity honed by the radar screens of World War 
II. 46 The coming decades the popularization of digital interactives modelled on radar displays 
secured that type’s reproduction on a mass scale. 
 
Extension + Attention = Multimedia  
As the compressed and focused attention of 1940s World War II hotspots dissolved into the 
indefinitely expanded temporal and spatial frontiers of 1950s cold warfare, extension and attention 
emerged as the principle challenges to effective aerial defense. Extension took the form of a vast 
American territory under threat by an enemy who could attack with devastating force and speed. 
By 1954 the rapidly augmenting aerial powers and munitions of the Soviet Union Strategic Air 
Command (SUSAC) had destroyed that sense of security two wide oceans had gifted to the 
                                               
Cybernetics,” in Purposive Systems; Proceedings of the First Annual Symposium of the American Society for Cybernetics, ed. Heinz 
Von Foerster et al. (New York: Spartan Books, 1969), 1–11. On Bateson, see Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan, “The 
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70–101. On Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss, see Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan, “From Information Theory to French 
Theory: Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss, and the Cybernetic Apparatus,” Critical Inquiry 38, no. 1 (2011): 96–126. For some of 
Garfinkel’s work along these lines, see Harold Garfinkel, Toward a Sociological Theory of Information, ed. Anne Warfield 
Rawls (Boulder, 2008). 
43 I thank Nina Franz of Weimar and Berlin for bringing Riesman’s remarks (and their salience to a technical history 
of aerial defense) to my attention. See David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. On 
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44 Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, 16. 
45 Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, 25. 
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Continental United States. SUSAC commanded squadrons of jet bombers capable of carrying 
hydrogen bombs at 600 miles per hour.47 Besides the fact that Soviet bombs’ blast area outstripped 
the range of artillery batteries responsible for defending against incursions, even the best defense 
would fail to stop dozens or hundreds of enemies from delivering atomic payloads to targets across 
the United States. One mathematical simulation by Project RAND predicted the likely destruction 
of thirty to sixty percent of US war industries in the case of an all-out Soviet attack by air.48 
 
The defensive problem of extension—the sufficient distribution of bodies in time and space—
coincided with maintaining perpetual vigilance amidst mind-numbing monotony. America’s 
Continental Air Defense Command (CADC), founded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1954, was 
responsible for maintaining a defensive perimeter along 10,000 continuous miles of border 
enclosing 3,000,000 square miles of territory, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, three-
hundred and sixty-five days a year. Compounding this challenge was the rapid growth in civilian 
air traffic to some 25,000 annual flights in domestic air space whose constant comings and goings 
had to be monitored and checked against the unlikely but ever-present possibility of discreet or all-
out enemy attacks. These indefinite threats demanded new forms of constant and definite attention. 
Widely dispersed radar defense networks needed to be porous but available for total, unhesitating 
mobilizations issued from centralized command locations. As a writer for Time commented, “Life 
on America's radar line—the 100-odd Aircraft Control and Warning stations—is an unsettling 
mixture of utter monotony and utmost intensity. Although every operator knows that the next blip 
on his radarscope could be the herald of death, staring steadily into the electronic eye can be 
endlessly boring.”49  
 
The interactive digital screens of SAGE provided an integrated solution to these problems of 
extension and attention. As early as 1950, engineers at MIT identified interactive displays with a 
graphical interface as the key to establishing continuous human-computer communications. Their 
implementation at first appeared cost-prohibitive.50 That changed when, in 1951, the Air Force 
awarded MIT a contract to develop a computerized air defense system (only later dubbed SAGE) 
that could assign computers the task of tracking planes and targeting trajectories while giving to 
human users— bound together by media such as telephones, screens, and maps—the tasks of 
confirming identifications, deciding responses, and calculating trajectories for interception.51 The 
need for screens was related to the innovative conception of computerized defense as a particular 
kind of dynamic and holistic system. Early proposals labelled the air defense project an “organism,” 
i.e. “a structure composed of distinct parts so constituted that the functioning of the parts and their 
relations to one another is [sic] governed by their relation to the whole.” 52 The command and 
control structure distributed across human and nonhuman networks demanded  an interactive 
display system that could rapidly relay information across these myriad steps. The most routine 
aspects of attention and extension—monitoring far-flung regions, isolating aberrant flight paths—
would be assumed by the digital computer. The concentration of human judgment on decision-
                                               
47 Figures from “The Supersonic Shield,” Time 64, no. 25 (December 20, 1954): 15-17. 
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making in case of the unexpected events called for displays that would offer an up-to-date portrait 
of the situation in-the-field and its precisely calibrated evaluation by the machines.  
  
Within the computerized aerial defense organism, interactive multimedial consoles—including 
screens, light guns (forerunners of the mouse), sound notifications, telephones, a variety of push-
button haptic interfaces, and even ashtrays—expanded the channels of engagement between 
digital system and users’ sensory apparatus. Through these channels what Simondon termed the 
“margin of indetermination” in information-processing machines invited human modification. “As 
soon as we received that contract,” an engineer in the aerial defense project recalled, “we needed 
more computers and more displays.” Larger, more sophisticated information processing meant 
more numerous visual displays and consoles for its manipulation. Based on a demo defensive 
system first mounted in Cape Cod, and given the limited task of monitoring and controlling air 
space around New England, MIT designers “realized that we needed a man-machine interactive 
display system to exercise control and soon found we needed a lot of displays to control over 400 
aircraft simultaneously. My estimate of 32 consoles grew to 64 and then to 82.”53 By 1953 the 
model Cape Cod System was up and running with a centralized “direction center” filled with the 
first digitally generated PPI screens and equipped with a keyboard for inputting feedback.54  
 
The Cape Cod System and its consoles became the model for the national SAGE air defense 
system, first announced in 1956 and put into partial operation in June 1958.55 Designers envisioned 
a network of local direction centers and regional command centers distributed across North 
America, each of which used massive digital computers and networked communication to rapidly 
collect, process, visually represent, and control aerial defense across the United States. [Figure 14] 
Data gathered from airborne radar, picket ships, Texas towers (so-named for their resemblance to 
drilling platforms in the gulf off of Texas), heavy radar installations on land, along with information 
fed in by ground observers, weather stations, and prerecorded flights plans, streamed through the 
AN/FSQ-7 direction center computer and AN/FSQ-8 combat center computer, which generated 
real-time images for the display of hundreds of interactive digital screens located in each center. 
The mutability of digital information allowed rapid communication across vast distances as well as 
real-time, multimodal interactions.  
 
Figure 14: Depiction of the main components in a coastal SAGE sector during an engagement with the enemy. 
Source: “The Master Mind.” Newsweek 47, no. 5 (January 30, 1956): 88. 
                                               
53 Hurst, et al., “Retrospectives,” 22. 
54 On the Cape Cod System, and for photographs of its direction center, see C. Robert Wieser, “The Cape Cod 
System,” Annals of the History of Computing 5, no. 4 (October 1983): 362–69. 
55 Stephen B. Johnson, The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation, 1945-1965 (Washington, D.C., 2002), 149, 
163. For a schematic overview of SAGE see Robert R. Everett, Charles A. Zraket, and Herbert D. Bennington, 
“SAGE-A Data-Processing System for Air Defense,” Annals of the History of Computing 5, no. 4 (October 1983): 330–39. 
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Figure 15: Diagram of a SAGE console depicting large central situation display screen, a smaller digital display, two 
wings, the major interface elements (screens, buttons, light gun, telephone, alarm), the major channels of information 
flow, and the human operator. Source: Theory of Operation of Display System for AN/FSQ-7 Combat Direction Center and 
AN/FSQ-8 Combat 
 
SAGE launched a new regime of territorial production through an assemblage of computers and 
human operators networked together by digital screens. Frontline in this production was the 
standard double-screened situation display (SD) console featuring an array of buttons, an 
interactive light gun, and an audio speaker (the term “situation display” referred to both the large 
CRT displaying the aerial “situation” and the console that hosted that CRT) [Fig. 15]. Its central 
main screen was a nineteen-inch circular PPI joining textual characters with figurations of flight 
vectors and cartography. As described above, every 2.62 seconds the screen refreshed to deliver a 
moment-by-moment “graphic display of the changing air situation, with correct geographical 
relations between fixed points and moving targets….”56 [Fig. 4] An additional five-inch square 
cathode-ray tube displayed letters, numerals, and special symbols concerning matters too static, 
wordy, or space-consuming to appear on the main screen.57 An array of switches on “wings” 
flanking the left and right sides of the central console enabled the interactive operations, such as 
switching the display between different “layers” of information or zooming in on particular 
quadrants. The interactive light gun allowed operators to label vectors onscreen as friend or foe. 
Regularly scheduled flights were programmed into the Direction Center’s computer in advance, 
allowing for the computer to assume the task of correlating routine flights with their prescheduled 
flight plans. Rather than constantly correlate the flights observed with written records, now the 
human operators could focus their attention on decision-making in situations of uncertainty. 
Interaction with the system, rather than record keeping, became the operators’ central task. 
 
The grouping of screens into clusters of tasks, on the one hand, and the layers of screening 
operations, on the other, reflected the designers’ intent that each console “display only those classes 
or parts of messages determined by the tactical problem assigned to the operator,” thereby making 
each screen function in a complex of human-nonhuman operations distributed throughout the 
direction center.58 The center itself comprised the air surveillance room, which was charged with 
monitoring all flight tracks [Fig. 3] and distinguishing ally from enemy; a weapons direction room 
                                               
56 Theory of Operation of Display System for AN/FSQ-7 Combat Direction Center and AN/FSQ-8 Combat Control Central, Volume I 
(Kingston, New York: International Business Machines Corporation, 1958), 18–19, online at 
https://archive.org/details/bitsavers_ibmsage362ug58_40521123. Henceforth Display System 
57 Display System, 18. 
58 Display System, 20. 
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for evaluating the threat of hostile tracks and targeting weapons appropriately; a command post or 
“control room” where officers surveyed information on the large screen and correlated it with 
communications from officers in adjacent sectors [Figs. 16-17]; and a simulation room for training 
purposes.59 As of the late 1950s, a national control room at the CADC in Colorado consolidated 
data from the sectors into a unified national picture. On account of the difficulty in instructing a 
computer how to filter noise like weather disturbances from its rendering of the aerial situation, 
engineers designed a mapping display whose surface could be marked up with crayon to screen the 
uptake of data into the computer by cameras mounted overhead [Fig. 18].   
 
 
Figure 16: Photograph of a SAGE command post featuring installations for the commanding officers, a projection 
screen at the front of the room displaying the overall aerial situation, and a situation display at the back of the room 
(foreground) for more detailed, interactive view of the aerial situation. Source: “Pushbutton Defense for Air War.” 
Life 42, no. 6 (1957): 62. 
 
 
Figure 17: Schematic diagram of the command post and its projection apparatus. Approximately twice a minute an 
analog slide of the electronic scene on the situation displays would be developed and projected. Five officer outposts 
arrayed around the screen also depicted.  Source: Theory of Operation of Display System for AN/FSQ-7 Combat Direction 
Center and AN/FSQ-8 Combat Control Central, Volume II. Kingston, New York: International Business Machines 
Corporation, 1958, 2. 
                                               
59 Bernd Ulmann, AN/FSQ-7: The Computer That Shaped the Cold War (Oldenbourg, 2014), 167. 
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Assembled, SAGE screens produced into a unified screenscape. The modularity of electronic data, 
the serialization of time, the granular disassembly of physical space into large swaths composed 
around time-critical operations enabled the production of this screenscape. Accounts of SAGE in 
LIFE, Time, Newsweek, and similar weeklies sought to produce a picture of this territory composed 
of bodies, techniques, instruments, and signs, but the result was flashy publicity and earnest prose. 
In Your Defense, an educational film from the period produced by the United States Air Force, 
economically encapsulated the ecology of operations relayed across the screens of SAGE.60 In a 
dramatized air raid, streams of data—collected from long-range radar posts, airborne radars in the 
bellies of planes overhead, radar picket ships, gap filler radars in the gaps between other outposts, 
Texas towers, and centers collating data on flights and weather—flash up on the situation displays, 
with audible alarms in the case of aberrancies and emergencies. Screening operations leap from 
the air surveillance room, where operators scan the sky for unfamiliar flights, to an identification 
room where operators sort friend from foe, and then to the command center where an officer issues 
orders to the weapons director who launches jets charged with clearing the sky of foreign elements. 
Information collated from multiple directions is forwarded to the centralized command center at 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a central control base in the Cheyenne 
Mountains of Colorado with real-time access to radar from across the continent.61 At each location 
a family of consoles, screens, and projections receives data from multiple sources, isolates key 
elements, presents data for human action, and collates that information for relay up the chain.  
 
 
 
Figure 18: The SAGE direction center video mapping consoles. The photoelectric devices overhead picked up 
graphics for processing into digital data for presentation on the situation displays and the command post projection. 
The layering of analog, digital, human, machine, and material (i.e. crayon marking) elements characterized the 
entirety of the SAGE network and its strategic distribution of screening operations. Source: “Pushbutton Defense for 
Air War.” Life 42, no. 6 (1957): 65. 
 
The Subject of the Interactive Digital Screen  
The digital screen can be traced to this family of images involved in the complex problem of 
computational screening for aerial defense. That circular screen that presented the first non-trivial, 
instrumentally effective working digital screen, embedded on a console and operated by a human 
user, originated in a chain of screening operations that distributed information processing along 
                                               
60 In Your Defense: The SAGE System (The United States Air Force, ca. 1960), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06drBN8nlWg. Courtesy the Computer History Museum, accession number 
102651595. 
61 NORAD moved to this location in 1961.  
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complex networks of humans and nonhumans. This chain of screening operations furnished up-
to-date pictures of the frontiers of an American territory SAGE itself produced. These multimedia 
operations produced new regimes of sovereignty for a president empowered, through NORAD 
and its webbed network of subordinates, to command and control a national territory whose 
contours coincided with the electronic screens reconstructing it. This digital screen also produced 
new regimes of human dependence for those reliant on digital machines to process and display 
information about the integrity of national territory. The digital interactive screen became the 
central mechanism for holding together this territory and the push-button a symbol of the era of 
warfare it sustained.62 
 
Recognizing SAGE interfaces as integral to the history of computing changes our account of what 
kind of psychic apparatus networked computing is. SAGE not only fashioned screens, alarms, 
buttons, and light guns but also shaped gazes, reflexes, and sociality among its teams of operators. 
The aforementioned features of the digital image—its constant updating, its ability to change 
segment by onscreen segment, the mutability of its representations—reflected the inadequacy of 
traditional maps and other media to the spatiotemporal rations of modern aerial defense. Just as 
new kind of psychic and strategic disposition belonged to the rise of this computer system, so too it 
introduced an entirely new technical apparatus. In order to implement SAGE military engineers 
developed many of the hallmarks of modern digital computing, including effective algebraic 
languages, magnetic core memory, synchronous parallel logic, touch screen technology, networked 
computing, video displays and computer graphics. The need for a new set of highly responsive and 
distributed technologies, like the need for the integration of humans into computer problem-solving 
series, ushered forth the apparatus of modern computing.63 The digital screen, the temporality of 
its networks, its storage mechanisms, its processing languages, and the psychology of its users 
matched the U. S. strategic circumstances of the early Cold War.  
 
The psychological hallmarks of the scope dope also point towards the design parallels that prevailed 
between Cold War arts and military engineering. As communications historian Fred Turner has 
argued, mid-century multimedia designers based in the US, such as Bauhaus refugee Herbert 
Bayer and designers Charles and Ray Eames crafted a new genre of multimedia exhibitions with 
an eye to cultivating dynamic liberal subjects capable of navigating the complex flows of 
information and difference characteristic of a modern liberal democracy.64 The challenges they 
faced and the solutions they reached echo those of SAGE engineers. In military strategy as in 
popular culture, the rise of American super power opened up new challenges for coping with the 
flow of persons, things, and ideas. In military strategy, as in arts and ideas, multimedia offered a 
strategy for buffering the overwhelming global flows buffeting national systems. Scope dopes 
adapted to multiple flows, negotiated competing inputs, and critically screened  incoming 
information to produce a secure yet porous national space.  
 
 
 
                                               
62 On push-button warfare, see “Push-Button Defense,” Newsweek, May 2, 1955, 27–28, 30; and on the iconic status of 
the push-button, see Rachel Plotnick, “At the Interface: The Case of the Electric Push Button, 1880–1923,” Technology 
and Culture 53, no. 4 (2012): 815–45. 
63 Regarding key innovations of the SAGE, see Edwards, The Closed World, 99–100. 
64 Fred Turner, The Democratic Surround: Multimedia and American Liberalism from World War II to the Psychedelic Sixties 
(Chicago, 2013). 
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The Martial Aesthetic of the Attention Economy 
The computational screening technologies of mid-century air defense gave rise to the conception 
of computing as a multimedia collaboration among humans and machines. This idea emerged 
most concretely in the work of three seminal theorists of human-computer interaction: J. C. R. 
Licklider, Ivan Sutherland, and Douglas Engelbart, whose work on the computer systems of  mid-
century air defense provided the basis for multimedia interactive computing. Licklider, a 
psychologist who worked on human factors in SAGE, announced the new era of human-machine 
collaboration with his seminal 1960 paper “Man-Computer Symbiosis.” Abandoning notions of 
computer and user as slave and master, Licklider likened them to interdependent organisms akin 
to a plant and its pollinating insects.65 His colleague Sutherland, considered the father of graphical 
user interfaces, adapted SAGE hardware for the 1962 Sketchpad software, which introduced direct 
use of graphics and a light pen as a primary instrument for real-time collaboration between human 
and computer.66 Engelbart credited his experience as a radar operator with inspiring the host of 
interactive and graphical technologies adopted in personal computing of the 1970s and 1980s. For 
Engelbart, “radar offered a model of a ‘virtual datascape’”67 capable of rendering any information 
in lively animated graphical and haptic forms. The field of computer gaming similarly evolved 
through modest adaptations of radar defense. Early games, such as Pong (1972) and Space Invaders 
(1978), were little more than digital exercises in aerial interception adapted for recreational use.68 
Users merely assumed the role formerly played by the SAGE operator, with aliens and tennis balls 
taking the place of Soviet projectiles. By the 1980s the personal computing and arcade games put 
the digital screens and multimedia interfaces developed around SAGE into homes and 
neighborhood malls across the United States.  
 
Parallel with the development of these new theories and products, SAGE gave rise to a global 
software industry premised on the mediations of vigilant humans in time-critical operations. 
Accounts of the digital computer prior to SAGE, such as John von Neumann’s seminal 1945 report 
on the EDVAC, had defined the computer in terms of a self-contained system. With SAGE, a new 
conception of computing as based on a mixture of practices, techniques, instruments, and 
persons—i.e. “software”—took shape.69 The company charged with developing SAGE software, 
the Systems Development Corporation (SDC), quickly grew to become the largest software 
company in the world, with its projects and personnel planting seeds for the logic of the 1970s and 
1980s software industry.70 SDC’s tremendous success came about by taking the situation of aerial 
defense teams, bound together by computerized radar defense, as the paradigm for software 
projects generally. It brought this ethos to work for domestic clients that included the Los Angeles 
Police Department, NASA, the Department of Transportation, the EPA and international projects 
that included command and control systems in Africa, Europe, and Asia, an automated weather 
reporting system in India. an earthquake warning system in Australia; and military training 
projects operated globally.71 These projects imparted a temporality of crisis to modern information 
processing to the burgeoning software industry, according to which the computer was an open 
                                               
65 Licklider, “Man-Computer Symbiosis.” 
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69 On how software industries came to account for social factors within computing, see Nathan L. Ensmenger, The 
Computer Boys Take Over: Computers, Programmers, and the Politics of Technical Expertise (Cambridge, MA, 2010). 
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system sustained by users perpetually engaged in time-critical operations for collective success. 
 
The principle icon of this new sociotechnical paradigm was the digital interactive screen whose 
technical hallmarks (processual, interactive, modular, gridded, time-critical) corresponded to a 
logic of continuous screening, regulating, enlisting, breaking-down of space, mapping, and time-
sensitive operations. That screen permitted a redistribution of human perceptions in ratios 
strategically matched to the challenge of jet propulsion and modern munitions. Users of that screen 
attuned their operations to the coordinates produced by an array of humans and instruments; they 
perpetually waited on incoming signals, ready to respond to them at a moment’s notice with a 
sophisticated network of mechanical aids to compose and relay a response. To these tasks 
corresponded a generalized experience of anxiety as well as a particular distribution of time and 
space around long pauses punctuated by intense moments of concentrated action. As modelled by 
military studies of vigilance, stress, and teamwork, these subjects were dynamic, adaptive types, 
capable of mobilizing their resources in response to sudden stress, cohering into integrated 
collaborative systems to meet the urgent threats of external agents. They traded experience for 
information, heroic individualism for well-ordered information ecologies.   
 
 
Figure 19: Facebook notification panel mixing characters, icons, alerts, affordances for voice communications, and a 
network of real-time peers within an electronic interface .“Facebook Notifications” by Stowe Boyd is licensed by 
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 2.0. 
 
From the 1990s onward, the World Wide Web incorporated this martial aesthetic honed in aerial 
defense into a burgeoning attention economy. The time-critical temporality of aerial defense 
became paradigmatic for an infinitely expandable base of users and devices whose ability to collect 
and process data depended on successfully recruiting user vigilance. Students and employees alike 
incorporated just-in-time-production and readiness for time-critical signals from afar into the 
everyday activities of work and leisure. Features of interactive digital screens of mid-century aerial 
defense—tones signaling the arrival of a message, urgent notifications interrupting the frame of the 
screen, headsets permitting real-time networked communications, and the mingling of flying 
graphical and textual elements—emerged as part of the standard stock of techniques for leveraging 
users into a state of constant alert [Fig. 19]. Echoing the co-emergence of national television and 
digital screens in the 1950s, where a new electronic screen permitted a new experience of 
 26 
immediacy to vast terrains, late twentieth-century television also mutated to parallel the 
temporality and mentality of computational screening. The threat of crisis and catastrophe, the 
sudden and destructive eruption of the unexpected that animated the liveness of television for 
decades, has become in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries the phenomenon of cable 
television—and thus mutated into a kind of 24-hour catastrophe machine, perpetually scanning 
the globe for intrusions in the flux of everyday monotony.72 In this way computational screening 
aligned itself with an attention economy familiar to those of us constantly mobilized by our digital 
devices to practice vigilance-in-monotony, to beware the eruption of the unpredicted amidst the 
incessant transmission of indifferent information.  
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